TY  - JOUR
T1  - Verification of limits on long-range nuclear SLCMs
AU  - Valerie Thomas
PY  - 1989
T2  - Science & Global Security
SP  - 27
EP  - 57
VL  - 1
IS  - 1-2
N2  - Arms control negotiators have identified a number of problems in verifying limits on long-range nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs). These are the difficulties of counting deployed SLCMs, of distinguishing nuclear from non-nuclear SLCMs, and the possibility of secret production or stockpiles. On-site inspection measures to monitor either a limit or a ban on nuclear SLCMs could include inspection of: ships and submarines where SLCMs are deployed or being loaded; production facilities; maintenance operations; and storage sites. While verification plans that involved either very few inspections or, at the other extreme, frequent inspections of ships and submarines might be acceptable, a reasonably effective verification plan with an intermediate level of intrusiveness is also possible. This would include monitoring of the production and maintenance of any non-nuclear long-range SLCMs and any nuclear long-range SLCMs not banned by the agreement. Tagging of these missiles to allow identification at subsequent inspections at shore-based maintenance depots would significantly decrease the probability that undetected SLCMs could be deployed or that non-nuclear SLCMs might be covertly converted to nuclear.
UR  - http://scienceandglobalsecurity.org/archive/sgs01thomas.pdf
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