tag:scienceandglobalsecurity.org,2011-07-12:/archive//2 2013-02-27T14:46:10Z Movable Type Pro 5.12 tag:scienceandglobalsecurity.org,2013:/archive//2.1091 2013-01-01T05:11:40Z 2013-02-27T14:46:10Z

Matthew Sharp, "Applications and Limitations of Nuclear Archaeology in Uranium Enrichment Plants," Science & Global Security 21, no. 1 (2013): 70-92.

Admin Science & Global Security 21, no. 1 (2013): 70-92, doi: 10.1080/08929882.2013.755028.]]>
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Robert Alvarez, "Managing the Uranium-233 Stockpile of the United States," Science & Global Security 21, no. 1 (2013): 53-69.

Admin Science & Global Security 21, no. 1 (2013): 53-69, doi: 10.1080/08929882.2013.754311.]]>
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Christopher M. Wright, "Low-Yield Nuclear Testing by North Korea in May 2010: Assessing the Evidence with Atmospheric Transport Models and Xenon Activity Calculations," Science & Global Security 21, no. 1 (2013): 3-52.

Admin Science & Global Security 21, no. 1 (2013): 3-52, doi: 10.1080/08929882.2013.754310.]]> De Geer (2012) that radionuclides detected at stations in South Korea, Japan, and Russia in May 2010 were evidence that North Korea conducted at least one unannounced low yield nuclear test on 11 May. It provides HYSPLIT (Hybrid Single Particle Lagrangian Integrated Trajectory Model) atmospheric transport modeling of the observed radionuclides assuming candidate origins in North Korea, ROK, Japan, Russia, mainland China, and Taiwan. Xenon activity calculations for reactor- and explosion-produced isotopes are used to ascertain possible release ratios and source terms. The HYSPLIT modeling finds that the most likely origin of the radionuclides is close to the site of North Korea's declared nuclear tests in 2006 and 2009. The activity calculations show that the source term is consistent with a nuclear test up to a few hundred tons yield. These results are discussed in the context of a decoupled but uncontained nuclear test by North Korea on 11 May 2010. If the scenario suggested by De Geer and supported here is correct, it seems that there is a significant possibility of detecting even a small, decoupled nuclear test in North East Asia using components of the International Monitoring System of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.

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"Editors’ Note," Science & Global Security 21, no. 1 (2013): 1-2.

Admin Science & Global Security 21, no. 1 (2013): 1-2, doi: 10.1080/08929882.2013.754305.]]>
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Vitaly Fedchenko, "A Review of “Our Own Worst Enemy? Institutional Interests and the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Expertise”," Science & Global Security 20, no. 2-3 (2012): 172-174.

Admin Science & Global Security 20, no. 2-3 (2012): 172-174, doi: 10.1080/08929882.2012.711184.]]>
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David P. Schaff, Won-young Kim, Paul G. Richards, "Seismological Constraints on Proposed Low-Yield Nuclear Testing in Particular Regions and Time Periods in the Past, with Comments on "Radionuclide Evidence for Low-Yield Nuclear Testing in North Korea in April/May 2010" by Lars-Erik De Geer," Science & Global Security 20, no. 2-3 (2012): 155-171.

Admin Science & Global Security 20, no. 2-3 (2012): 155-171, doi: 10.1080/08929882.2012.711183.]]> proposed by De Geer. We searched the seismic data recorded by station MDJ in northeastern China, applying three-component cross-correlation methods using signals from known explosions as templates. We assess the capability of this method of detection, and of simpler methods, all of which failed to find seismic signals that would be expected if De Geer's scenarios were valid. We conclude that no well-coupled underground explosion above about a ton occurred near the North Korea test site on these five days and that any explosion would have to be very small (local magnitude less than about 2) to escape detection.

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Alexander Glaser, Uwe Filges, "Neutron-Use Optimization with Virtual Experiments to Facilitate Research-Reactor Conversion to Low-Enriched Fuel," Science & Global Security 20, no. 2-3 (2012): 141-154.

Admin Science & Global Security 20, no. 2-3 (2012): 141-154, doi: 10.1080/08929882.2012.713765.]]>
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Tamara Patton, "Combining Satellite Imagery and 3D Drawing Tools for Nonproliferation Analysis: A Case Study of Pakistan's Khushab Plutonium Production Reactors," Science & Global Security 20, no. 2-3 (2012): 117-140.

Admin Science & Global Security 20, no. 2-3 (2012): 117-140, doi: 10.1080/08929882.2012.719383.]]>
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Thomas Mo Willig, Cecilia Futsaether, Halvor Kippe, "Converting the Iranian Heavy Water Reactor IR-40 to a More Proliferation-Resistant Reactor," Science & Global Security 20, no. 2-3 (2012): 97-116.

Admin Science & Global Security 20, no. 2-3 (2012): 97-116, doi: 10.1080/08929882.2012.713767.]]>
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Jochen Ahlswede, Martin B. Kalinowski, "Global Plutonium Production Capabilities with Civilian Research Reactors," Science & Global Security 20, no. 2-3 (2012): 69-96.

Admin Science & Global Security 20, no. 2-3 (2012): 69-96, doi: 10.1080/08929882.2012.724226.]]>
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"Editors’ Note," Science & Global Security 20, no. 2-3 (2012): iii-iv.

Admin Science & Global Security 20, no. 2-3 (2012): iii-iv, doi: 10.1080/08929882.2012.719421.]]>
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David Hafemeister, "A Review of "Detect and Deter: Can Countries Verify the Nuclear Test Ban"," Science & Global Security 20, no. 1 (2012): 64-67.

Admin Science & Global Security 20, no. 1 (2012): 64-67, doi: 10.1080/08929882.2012.652559.]]>
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Dean Knox, "Nuclear Security and Nuclear Emergency Response in China," Science & Global Security 20, no. 1 (2012): 30-63.

Admin Science & Global Security 20, no. 1 (2012): 30-63, doi: 10.1080/08929882.2012.652562.]]>
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Lars-Erik De Geer, "Radionuclide Evidence for Low-Yield Nuclear Testing in North Korea in April/May 2010," Science & Global Security 20, no. 1 (2012): 1-29.

Admin Science & Global Security 20, no. 1 (2012): 1-29, doi: 10.1080/08929882.2012.652558.]]>
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"Editors' Note," Science & Global Security 20, no. 1 (2012): iii-iv.

Admin Science & Global Security 20, no. 1 (2012): iii-iv, doi: 10.1080/08929882.2012.652557.]]>
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