@article{
author = {Valerie Thomas},
title = {Verification of limits on long-range nuclear SLCMs},
journal = {Science & Global Security},
volume = {1},
number = {1-2},
pages = {27-57},
year = {1989},
URL = {https://scienceandglobalsecurity.org/archive/1989/01/verification_of_limits_on_long.html},
eprint = {http://scienceandglobalsecurity.org/archive/sgs01thomas.pdf},
abstract = {Arms control negotiators have identified a number of problems in verifying limits on long-range nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs). These are the difficulties of counting deployed SLCMs, of distinguishing nuclear from non-nuclear SLCMs, and the possibility of secret production or stockpiles. On-site inspection measures to monitor either a limit or a ban on nuclear SLCMs could include inspection of: ships and submarines where SLCMs are deployed or being loaded; production facilities; maintenance operations; and storage sites. While verification plans that involved either very few inspections or, at the other extreme, frequent inspections of ships and submarines might be acceptable, a reasonably effective verification plan with an intermediate level of intrusiveness is also possible. This would include monitoring of the production and maintenance of any non-nuclear long-range SLCMs and any nuclear long-range SLCMs not banned by the agreement. Tagging of these missiles to allow identification at subsequent inspections at shore-based maintenance depots would significantly decrease the probability that undetected SLCMs could be deployed or that non-nuclear SLCMs might be covertly converted to nuclear.}
}