O. Bukharin, "U.S.-Russian Bilateral Transparency Regime to Verify Nonproduction of HEU," Science & Global Security, 10, no. 3, (2002): 211-221.
A bilateral U.S.-Russian regime to confirm that that neither country secretly produces fresh highly enriched uranium (HEU) would be an important nonproliferation and nuclear threat reduction initiative. It would close the remaining loophole in the emerging system of international controls of fissile materials and make reductions in the U.S. and Russian HEU stockpiles irreversible. An HEU nonproduction transparency regime appears feasible. Applicable monitoring technologies and procedures already exist and have been tested operationally. U.S.-Russian cooperation in the areas of HEU and plutonium disposition and other nuclear technology applications could provide Russia with a needed incentive to participate in the proposed regime.
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