Jayson R. Vavrek, Luozhong Zhou, Joshua Boverhof, Elisa R. Heymann, Barton P. Miller, Sean Peisert, "Differential Fuzz Testing to Detect Tampering in Sensor Systems and Its Application to Arms Control Authentication," Science & Global Security 33, no. 1-3 (2025): 122-143
In future nuclear arms control treaties, it will be necessary to authenticate the hardware and software components of verification measurement systems. This article introduces the concept of physical differential fuzz testing as a challenge- response-style tamper indicator that can holistically and simultaneously test various components in a cyber-physical system. This concept is then applied to authenticating the radiation measurement equipment in nuclear weapon verification systems and conducting demonstration fuzz testing measurements with a sodium iodide (NaI) gamma ray spectrometer. We show that physical differential fuzz testing can detect two types of tamper attempts, and conclude that it is a promising framework for authenticating future cyber-physical systems in nuclear arms control, safeguards, and beyond.
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